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Pennsylvania's Mandatory Sentencing Act
Five Years With a Gun:
Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative
Power or Proper Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion?
"Where the law ends, tyranny begins."'
I. Introduction
The Pennsylvania mandatory sentencing statutes grew out of
the reaction of elected officials to the perceived public outcry against
an increase in crimes, the use of firearms in the commission of
crimes, and a growing apprehension that sentences imposed were not
commensurate with the seriousness of corresponding offenses.2 Since
his election, Governor Thornburgh actively pursued and promoted an
extensive program designed to "get tough on crime." One aspect of
I. The quote is attributed to William Pitt and is cited in DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
3 (1969).
2. Prior to the enactment of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982), sentences for the crimes
enumerated in that section (see infra note 22) were to be within a maximum and minimum
range set by statute. (Cf. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (1973), aggravated assault as a felony,
maximum of 10 years, a minimum of no more than 5 years). The court determines the actual
sentence pursuant to standards mandated by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721 (1980).
Section 9721(b) requires that the court impose a sentence of confinement that is consis-
tent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on
the life of the victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Fur-
ther, the court must consider the sentencing guides adopted and promulgated by the Pennsyl-
vania Commission on Sentencing.
In essence, these guidelines provide for three possible sentencing ranges, a minimum (or
standard), an aggravated and a mitigated, with the proper range to be determined by comput-
ing the offense gravity score and the prior record score according to factors and tables pro-
vided. These two scores are then utilized to enter and apply the "sentence range chart."
Detailed procedures to accomplish this objective are set forth in the SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES, 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 303.1-303.9 (Shepard's 1982).
In imposing sentence, the court must make as part of the record a statement of the rea-
sons for the sentence imposed, setting forth the guideline factors the court considered and the
weight attached to them, and the facts concerning the circumstances of the offense and char-
acter of the defendant, including his potential for rehabilitation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 342 Pa. Super. 45, 492 A.2d 55 (1985).
Importantly, section 9721(b) mandates that, if the court imposes a sentence outside the
sentencing guidelines, the court provide a contemporaneous written statement of the reason for
the deviation from the guidelines. Section 9721(b) provides that failure to comply constitutes
grounds for vacating the sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 343 Pa. Super.
596, 495 A.2d 956 (1985).
3. Governor Thornburgh's press release dated October 2, 1985, updated his administra-
tion's ongoing "crime fighting campaign." Though the press release was not directed at the
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, the administration did claim that "[in 1982, at Thorn-
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this program has involved legislation establishing mandatory mini-
mum sentences for crimes considered to be especially offensive.'
Pennsylvania's present Drunk Driving Law," enacted in 1982, is one
highly visible example of this growing trend.
A less notorious but nonetheless important example of the
movement is Pennsylvania's Mandatory Sentencing Act ("Act"),
which provides for the imposition of a mandatory sentence of five
years for certain offenses committed with firearms." There is no ex-
tensive legislative history concerning the Act.7 Its purpose, according
to Justice Larsen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is to assure
"lengthened incarceration for felons who make visible use of firearms
in the execution of their criminal deeds . . . [which has] the effect of
maintaining in the citizenry much needed confidence in our criminal
system." 8
burgh's suggestion, the General Assembly approved legislation imposing mandatory sentences
for . . . offenders using firearms." The Governor's release announced the proposal of legisla-
tion that would permit lengthened minimum sentences. The current sentencing code set the
minimum at "no more than half of the maximum." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9755(b) and
9756(b) (1980). The legislation proposed would allow a minimum sentence to be imposed up
to "the maximum allowed by law."
It is interesting to note the way in which the Governor justified the need for this legisla-
tion. "I am proposing today that the judge, who has heard all of the evidence, and is in the
best position to determine the appropriate sentence, have the authority to issue sentences that
fit the crime and the criminal .... " (emphasis added)
4. See, e.g., 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9713 (1982) (sentences for offenses committed on
public transportation); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9714 (1982) (providing for life imprisonment for
homicide); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9717 (1982) (sentences for offenses against elderly persons);
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9718 (1982) (sentences for offenses against infant persons).
5. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731(e) (1982) provides as follows:
(e) Penalty -
(I) Any person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misde-
meanor of the second degree and the sentencing court shall order the person to
pay a fine of not less than $300 and serve a minimum term of imprisonment of:
(i) not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(ii) not less than 30 days if the person has previously been convicted of an of-
fense under this section or of an equivalent offense in this or other jurisdictions
within the previous seven years.
(iii) not less than 90 days if the person has twice previously been convicted of an
offense under this section or of an equivalent offense in this or other jurisdictions
within the previous seven years.
(iv) not less than one year if the person has three times previously been con-
victed of an offense under this section or of an equivalent offense in this or other
jurisdictions within the previous seven years.
(2) Acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or any other form of
preliminary disposition of any charge brought under this section shall be consid-
ered a first conviction for the purpose of computing whether a subsequent con-
viction of a violation of this section shall be considered a second, third, fourth or
subsequent conviction.
6. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982) [hereinafter "Act"]. See infra note 22 for the full
text of the Act.
7. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
8. Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 43, 494 A.2d 354, 363 (1985) (Larsen, J.,
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Certainly any attempt to foster public confidence in the criminal
justice system is worthwhile. It is, however, at least debatable
whether mandatory sentencing schemes further this goal.' It is also
questionable whether a statute that raises serious constitutional
questions should be used to achieve such a result. While a court will
not and should not pass on the former question,'0 a court is uniquely
qualified, and duty-bound, to provide an answer to the latter."
After a brief overview of the provisions 2 and legislative his-
tory"3 of the Act, this comment will examine Commonwealth v.
Wright,'" a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case declaring the
Act constitutional.' 5 This comment will then raise a serious constitu-
tional issue not adequately addressed in Wright. Specifically, it will
consider whether the Act, because it allows a prosecutor standardless
discretion in deciding to pursue a mandatory sentence, is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power,' 6 or whether the discretion
exercised by the prosecutor at this sentencing stage is no greater
than that exercised at any other stage of the prosecution. Both the
nature of the non-delegation doctrine' 7 under the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution'8 and the scope of the prosecutor's discretion'9 will be ex-
amined in order to determine the constitutionality of the statute in
this context.
II. Background
A. The Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act and its Legislative
concurring), aff'd, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986).
9. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCE-
DURES, Standard 18-2.1(c) (1980), provides: "[T]he legislature should not specify a mandatory
sentence for any sentencing category or for a particular offense."
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch 137) (1803).
II. See Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 164 (1853). ("An act should be
declared unconstitutional (by a court) if and only if it violates the Constitution, clearly, palpa-
bly, and plainly.")
12. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
14. 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985), aff'd, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411
(1986).
15. See infra notes 37-82 and accompanying text.
16. This issue was first raised in Commonwealth v. Dennison, 10 Phila. Rep. 531. In a
well-reasoned opinion written by Judge Avellino, the court en bane ruled that the delegation
was unconstitutional. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 85-126 and accompa-
nying text.
17. See infra notes 83-117 and accompanying text.
18. See PA. CONST. art. II, § 1, which provides, "The legislative power of this Common-
wealth shall be vested in the General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives."
19. See infra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
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History
What was to become the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act
was first proposed in the Pennsylvania State Senate in September of
198120 as an amendment" to Title Forty-Two of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes (Judiciary and Judicial Proceedings). The
Act2 2 provides for the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years imprisonment upon conviction for having committed one
of the enumerated offenses while visibly possessing a firearm.2 3
These enumerated offenses are robbery, voluntary manslaughter,
murder in the third degree, rape, involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course, and aggravated assault.
Before the court imposes the mandatory minimum sentence, two
conditions must be satisfied. First, the prosecutor must give reasona-
ble notice following conviction of the Commonwealth's intention to
20. Pa. S. 1081, 1981 Session, printed in HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, SESSIONS OF 1981-
82 at A-141 (1982).
21. The Act replaced 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1312, which provided in pertinent part: "In
all cases except where the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder, the sentence
shall be determined by the court as authorized by law." See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721 et seq.
(1980).
22. The Act reads as follows:
(a) Mandatory sentence.-Any person who is convicted in any court of this
Commonwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery as defined in 18 Pa. C.S. §
3701(a)(1)(i), (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), aggravated assault as defined in
18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(1), (relating to aggravated assault) or kidnapping, or who
is convicted of attempt to commit any of these crimes, shall, if the person visibly
possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a mini-
mum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any
other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
(b) Proof of sentencing.-Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the
crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to convic-
tion, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under
this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The court
shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Common-
wealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional
evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section
is applicable.
(c) Authority of court in sentencing.-There shall be no authority in any court
to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence
than provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to
suspend sentence. Nothing in this section shall prevent the sentencing court from
imposing a sentence greater than that provided in this section. Sentencing guide-
lines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not su-
persede the mandatory sentences provided in this section.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
23. For an interesting discussion concerning what is a firearm for purposes of the Act,
see Commonwealth v. Williams, Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Docket No. 1737
C.A. (1984) (holding a pellet gun was not a firearm for purposes of the Act). 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9712(a) (1982).
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proceed under the sentencing scheme.24 Second, after receiving this
notice, the sentencing court must find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the accused visibly possessed a firearm while committing
the enumerated offense. 5 Upon such a finding the sentencing court
must impose a minimum sentence of at least five years imprison-
ment. The sentencing court's only discretionary choice is whether to
impose a sentence greater than five years.2"
As noted, the legislative history of the Act is virtually non-exis-
tent.2 7 The three printings of the legislation during its consideration
by the Senate28 show that the Act underwent an extensive re-draft-
ing.29 In its original form, 0 the Act did not provide for a notice re-
quirement on the part of the prosecutor. The Act was therefore self-
executing; the prosecutor had no discretion whatsoever."' In the final
printing of the Act, prior to the Senate's final consideration, the Sen-
ate added the notice requirement."2 This gives the prosecutor consid-
erable latitude. There is, however, no recorded debate to explain the
inclusion of this notice provision and the resulting prosecutorial dis-
cretion. The only mention of the bill in recorded debate consisted of
a brief speech by Senator O'Pake. 83 His remarks focused exclusively
on the problem of prison overcrowding that would result in light of
this legislation.-"
The Act, as amended, passed the Senate in December 1981. It
was then sent to the House of Representatives, where final passage
occurred in late February 1982. Again, there was no recorded de-
bate. 5 In the absence of any pertinent debate, the courts have been
forced to consider the plain language of the Act, as well as other
factors, in determining the legislative intent.3 6
24. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b).
25. Id. The court makes this finding of fact at a sentencing hearing. The only factor to
be considered by the court at sentencing is whether the accused visibly possessed a firearm.
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712(a) (1982).
27. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
28. Pa. S. 1081, SENATE BILLS, printer's number 1270 (1981).
29. Pa. S. 1081, SENATE BILLS, printer's number 1515 (1981).
30. Pa. S. 1081, SENATE BILLS, printer's number 1270 (1981).
31. Id.
32. Pa. S. 1081, SENATE BILLS, printer's number 1515 (1981).
33. SENATE JOURNAL 1981 Session, 1208 (Pennsylvania 1981).
34. Id.
35. HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, Sessions 1981-82, at A-141 (Pennsylvania 1982).
36. The trial court in Dennison used an interesting approach to this problem. The court
examined the other mandatory minimum sentencing schemes for crimes committed on public
transportation, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9714 (1982), against the elderly, see 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9717 (1982), and against infants, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9718 (1982). The court
then noted that two of these subsequent mandatory sentencing acts had no notice requirement
and were thus self-executing. See Dennison, 10 Phila. Rep. at 539. The importance of this was
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B. The Wright Decision
In Commonwealth v. Wright,37 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania upheld the constitutionality of the Mandatory Minimum Sen-
tencing Act. For purposes of appeal, the Court consolidated five trial
court decisions. In each case, the trial court convicted the defendant
of one of the Section's enumerated offenses,3 8 and the prosecutor
gave notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under the
statute. In four of the cases,39 the trial court held the Act unconsti-
tutional and refused to apply the mandatory minimum sentence. The
courts then sentenced the defendants according to the guidelines"0
set forth in Pennsylvania's indeterminant sentencing statute. In the
fifth case,' 1 the trial court rejected the defendant's arguments and
sentenced her in accordance with the Act.
The constitutional challenge posed by the five defendants cen-
tered on the intent and proof subsection of the Act.' 2 That subsec-
tion provides that possession of a firearm is not an element of the
crime itself. While notice to the defendant of the intent to seek sen-
tencing under the mandatory provisions is not required prior to con-
to discount the argument that the legislative policy of all the minimum mandatory sentencing
schemes allowed the prosecutor this measure of discretion. See Dennison, 10 Phila. at 538. But
see, Wright, 508 Pa. at 40 n.4, 494 A.2d at 361 n.4 (court states that the legislative judgment
was to afford the prosecutor this discretion).
37. 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985).
38. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
39. (I) In Commonwealth v. McMillan, No. 28 E.D., Appeal Docket 1984, appellee
McMillan was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(1)
(1973), and possession of instruments of crime generally, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 907(a) (1973).
He was sentenced to concurrent terms of three to ten and two and one-half to five years,
respectively.
(2) In Commonwealth v. Peterson, No. 62 E.D. Appeal Docket 1984, appellee Peter-
son was convicted after a bench trial of voluntary manslaughter, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503,
(1973) and possession of instruments of crime generally. She received a sentence of one to six
years on the manslaughter charge and a concurrent six to eighteen month sentence on the
weapons count.
(3) In Commonwealth v. Dennison, No. 101 E.D. Appeal Docket 1984, appellee Den-
nison was convicted by a judge of aggravated assault and possession of instruments of crime
generally. Concurrent sentences of eleven and one-half to twenty-three months were imposed.
(4) In Commonwealth v. Smalls, No. 106 E.D. Appeal Docket 1984, appellee Smalls
was convicted after a bench trial of robbery, 19 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(a)(1) (1976), and
criminal conspiracy, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903 (1978), for which he was sentenced to concur-
rent four to eight year terms. He also was convicted of violation of the Uniform Firearms Act,
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705 (1973), for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of two and
one-half to five and one to two years respectively. Sentence was suspended on his conviction of
possession of instruments of crime.
40. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
41. In Commonwealth v. Wright, No. 4 E.D. Appeal Docket 1984, appellee Wright
pleaded guilty to the charge of robbery and was sentenced to five years imprisonment pursuant
to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
42. Wright at 30, 494 A.2d at 356.
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viction, reasonable notice must be given to the defendant of the
Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section after con-
viction. The subsection also provides that the applicability of the Act
depends on visible possession of a firearm demonstrated by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, and this shall be determined by the court at
sentencing." The question raised in four of the cases at the trial
level was whether the preponderance standard was violative of due
process." In the fifth case, Commonwealth v. Dennison," the trial
court held that the act was constitutionally infirm because it consti-
tuted an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the
executive.
Most of the Wright opinion addressed the due process" question
raised by the preponderance standard. The defendants put forth
two different but related arguments. First, the statute improperly al-
lowed for the imposition of an enhanced mandatory penalty on the
lowest burden of proof 8 recognized in the law,4 '9 the preponderance
standard. 60 Second, the Act allowed imposition of a mandatory sen-
tence based upon the establishment of a discrete critical fact relating
to the circumstances of the offense, without requiring proof of the
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 The defendants claimed that this
critical fact, visible possession of a firearm, was an element of the
crime for which the court was sentencing the defendant. As such,
they argued, the United States Supreme Court mandated in In re
Winship5 2 and Mullaney v. Wilbur5 that visible possession must be
43. See supra note 22 subsection (b).
44. Wright at 31, 494 A.2d at 357.
45. 10 Phila. Rep. 531.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that "[No state shall ... deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
47. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relegated discussion of the delegation question to
a brief footnote. See Wright at 40, n.4, 494 A.2d at 361, n.4. See infra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text.
48. The Supreme Court of the United States stated the reasoning behind the different
burdens of proof as follows: "[The burden] instructs the fact finder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
49. There are three standards of proof to which the prosecutor may be held: (1) Prepon-
derance of the Evidence - "a finding that [a fact] is more probable than not." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1064 (5th Ed. 1979); (2) Clear and Convincing - "The measure of degree of
proof which will produce in the mind of the fact finder, a firm belief as to the correctness of
the allegations sought to be established. Id. at 227; (3) Beyond a Reasonable Doubt - "the
fact finder must be entirely convinced [of the existence of fact], satisfied to a moral certainty."
Id. at 147.
50. Wright at 31, 494 A.2d at 356.
51. Id.
52. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In Winship, the Supreme Court mandated that the prosecution
must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected both arguments.5'
The court began by noting that the legislature has expressly provided
that the provisions of the Act shall not be an element of the crime
55
and that it is the province of the legislature56 to define these ele-
ments.57 The court then discussed the definition of an element, and
concluded that under Pennsylvania law, even in the absence of an
explicit statement by the legislature, visible possession of a firearm
could not be considered an element of the crime of which a defend-
ant subject to the Act has been convicted."
The court then discussed the argument that In re Winship" and
Mullaney6 compelled a contrary conclusion. The court acknowl-
edged that Mullaney appeared to indicate that the holding in Win-
ship was not limited to the elements of a crime as defined by the
state legislature. 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, rely-
ing on Patterson v. New York,6" and the reluctance of the United
53. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). In Mullaney the Court held that a Maine statute which at-
tempted to define a single homicide offense (with degrees of sentencing) was unconstitutional.
The burden was shifted to the defense to prove the presence of "heat of passion" or "sudden
provocation" in order to lower the degree for sentencing purposes. The Court stated that the
State was required to prove the absence of these elements, for they were criminal facts which
went to the degree of the defendant's culpability.
54. Wright at 32, 494 A.2d at 357.
55. See supra note 22 subsection (b) and accompanying text.
56. Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
57. But see Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698. (The Court extended the rationale of Winship,
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to discrete critical facts that establish the required
culpability. This burden of proof was therefore not limited to those elements as explicitly de-
fined by the legislature.)
58. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines an element of an offense as follows:
[S]uch conduct or such attendant circumstances or such a result of conduct as:
(1) is included in the discipline of the offense;
(2) establishes the required degree of culpability;
(3) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct;
(4) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or
(5) establishes jurisdiction or venue.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103 (1982).
59.
Visible possession of a firearm is neither included in the definitions of the felo-
nies enumerated in section 9712(a) nor does it establish the culpability required
under those definitions. See 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 2502(c), 2503, 2702(a)(1), 2901,
3121, 3123, 3701(a)(1)(i)-(iii). Subsections (3), (4), and (5) of the statutory
definition of "element of an offense" are clearly inapplicable. Thus, under Penn-
sylvania law, even in the absence of an explicit statement by the legislature,
visible possession of a firearm could not be considered an element of the crime of
which defendant subject to section 9712 has been convicted.
Wright at 32, 494 A.2d at 357 (1985).
60. See supra note 52.
61. See supra notes 53 and 57.
62. Wright at 33, 494 A.2d at 358.
63. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). The United States Supreme Court refused to extend Mullaney
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States Supreme Court to extend Winship, gave Mullaney a much
narrower reading. 4 The court applied the reasonable doubt standard
to those facts which go to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
not those relating to the severity of the punishment.65 The court went
on to say that visible possession of a firearm was a sentencing factor
to be considered only after conviction of one of the enumerated of-
fenses;66 it in no way relieved the prosecution of its burden of prov-
ing guilt.67 Thus, the court reasoned that under Winship, Mullaney
and Patterson, the Due Process Clause did not require that visible
possession of a firearm be treated as an element of the underlying
offense that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.68
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the
mandatory minimum sentence's dependence on the determination of
a fact by only a preponderance standard violated due process. The
court noted 69 that while the sentencing procedure must comport with
the basic requirements of the Due Process Clause, 0 the defendant
need not be accorded the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural
rights.7 1 The court then said that the reasonable doubt standard dur-
ing a sentencing hearing was not one of those basic rights which are
essential.72 To determine the minimum burden of proof tolerated by
due process in a given proceeding, the court balanced the public and
private interests involved, and it also made a policy judgment as to
how the risk of error should be allocated among the parties.7 The
court found the liberty interests of the defendants to be similar to
the interest of any convicted felon; the prior determination of guilt
had extinguished his right to remain free.7 ' The court further found
and Winship so as to require New York to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
extreme emotional disturbance. It found that the existence of extreme emotional disturbance
as a mitigating factor was a separate issue which did not negate any elements which the State
was required to prove.
64. Wright at 35-36, 494 A.2d at 359.
65. Id.
66. Id. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
67. Wright at 35, 494 A.2d at 359.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing is a critical stage for right to
counsel purposes); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 898
(1968) (defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the sentencing procedure).
71. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 n.9 (1977).
72. Wright at 37-38, 494 A.2d at 360.
73. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 428 (1979)).
74. But see Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Supreme Court mandated an interme-
diate standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence, when the individual interest at stake
was more substantial than the mere loss of money. Viewed in the light of an aggravated as-
sault conviction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's argument loses a bit of its luster. If the
convicted felon were sentenced under 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3921 (1982), other factors, such as
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a countervailing, "unquestionably important" interest on behalf of
the Commonwealth to protect the public from armed felons and to
deter the use of firearms.70  The court concluded that, having
weighed the interests involved together with the fact that the risk of
error was slight,7 6 it was not unreasonable for the defendant to share
equally with the Commonwealth any risk of error in the fact finding
process. The preponderance standard, therefore, satisfied the mini-
mum requirements of due process.7
The court gave only a cursory review to the delegation argu-
ment raised by the Dennison case.7 8 It merited but one line of text,
79
accompanied by a footnote. 80 The court flatly rejected the argument
that the Act violated the separation of powers principle by depriving
the sentencing court of discretion in the sentencing procedure. 81 This
issue, however, was not raised in the Dennison opinion. The court
similarly dismissed the illegal delegation argument, which had led a
Philadelphia Common Pleas court sitting en banc to rule the Act
unconstitutional.8 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
delegation of the power to decide whether to pursue the mandatory
sentence was constitutional because there was no significant distinc-
tion between the discretion afforded in the Act and the discretion
exercised by the prosecutor at any other stage of the criminal
prosecution.
the defendant's background, possibility of rehabilitation and any mitigating circumstances
would be used to determine the sentence. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. While it is
true he could receive the maximum of five to ten years, it is likely he would receive a lesser
sentence. In that sense, the increased duration of the loss of one's own liberty would seem to
amount to more than the "mere loss of money."
75. Wright at 40, 494 A.2d at 361-62.
76. Id. (The Court stated that visible possession of a firearm was a straightforward de-
termination with scant potential that suspicion and conjecture will enter into the fact finder's
decision. The decision was also open to appellate review, which further served to decrease the
risk to the defendant).
77. Wright at 41, 494 A.2d at 362.
78. Commonwealth v. Dennison, 10 Phila. Rep. 531.
79. Wright at 40, 494 A.2d at 361.
80. Id. n.4, as follows:
4. For this reason the argument that section 9712 violates the separation of pow-
ers principle by depriving the sentencing court of discretion may be rejected out
of hand. We must also decline the invitation to hold that section 9712 improp-
erly delegates this legislative power to the executive by giving the prosecution
discretion whether to invoke the mandatory sentencing procedure. We perceive
no distinction between such an exercise of discretion and the prosecutorial dis-
cretion exercised at any other stage of the criminal prosecution. The decision to
accord the Commonwealth a measure of discretion as to whether to employ sec-




III. The Non-Delegation Doctrine
A. Non-Delegation in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that legislative power,
which is the power to make, alter, and repeal laws, shall vest in the
General Assembly, consisting of the Senate and House of Represent-
atives.83 This explicit grant of power to legislate,84 in combination
with the doctrine of separation of powers8" among the three co-equal
branches of government, gives rise to the non-delegation doctrine.
The non-delegation doctrine prohibits the delegation of legislative
power to the executive, judiciary, or the people of the
Commonwealth .8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid the foundation for the
determination of what is and what is not a delegation of legislative
power in Locke's Appeal8 7 in 1871. In overruling Parker v. Com-
monwealth,88 the court held constitutional a legislative act89 granting
counties the right of local option in the granting of liquor licenses.90
Justice Agnew wrote that "[t]he legislature cannot delegate its
power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make its own action depend." ' Thus, the court held that
the determination by the electorate that the populace was for or
against the granting of liquor licenses in their own ward was not an
unconstitutional delegation by the legislature. Despite powerful pre-
cedent and strong dissents by Chief Justice Read 92 and Justice Shar-
83. O'Neill v. American Fire Insurance Co., 166 Pa. 72, 30 A. 943 (1895).
84. PA. CONST art. II, § 1.
85. A recent Commonwealth Court opinion pointed out:
The principal of separation of powers is the cornerstone of our democratic form
of Government. From the historical perspective persuaded by Hamilton, Jay and
Madison, to the present time, it has been and remains, a valid doctrine deter-
mining the structure of both our State and Federal systems, and is the statement
of the parameters with which each of the branches of Government operates.
Heller v. Frankston, 83 Pa. Commw. 294, 302, 464 A,2d 581, 585 (1983).
86. See Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1871), discussed infra notes 87-93 and accompany-
ing text.
87. 72 Pa. 491 (1871).
88. 6 Pa. 507 (1847). In Parker, the supreme court ruled that this granting of a local
option to determine whether a liquor license should issue was an illegal delegation of legislative
power.
89. Act of May 3, 1871 (P.L. 523).
90. The facts in Locke involved a vote by a ward in Philadelphia about a particular
liquor license. If the majority of voters cast ballots against the licenses, then the act made it
illegal to issue such a license.
91. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. at 498 (emphasis added).
92. Chief Justice Read argued as follows:
By whom is this law enacted? Clearly not by the legislature, but by the voters,
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swood, 93 the court opined that this determination of fact or state of
things was not an exercise of the legislative power by the electorate.
This rationale, although axiomatic today, is not, in and of itself, suf-
ficient to hold constitutional a law which permits an administrative
board to determine policy. The legislature must further provide ap-
propriate and adequate standards and guidelines in order to guide
these determinations.'
The legislature may confer authority and discretion in connec-
tion with the execution of the law. 5 It may not, however, delegate
this authority without providing standards that limit and define these
discretionary powers with reasonable clarity.9 6 Although administra-
tive details need not be specifically outlined in the statute,97 vague or
nonexistent standards that fail to delineate with some clarity the
bounds of the administrator's power are not adequate. 8
In determining the adequacy of standards accompanying a leg-
islative delegation," the court is not bound by the mere letter of the
without discussion, and in secret, no man knowing how his next door neighbor
voted, nor his reason for casting his ballot as he has chosen to do. The question
therefore, of license or no license is decided by whom the Constitution has
stripped of all legislative power or authority. This isa legislative question purely
and must be decided . . . openly and publicly.
Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. at 503 (Read, C.J., dissenting).
93. Justice Sharswood argued:
Now I think no one would doubt, if the legislature were to submit to the people
of the county or township, or ward, the question whether murder should be pun-
ished by imprisonment only, and let the people vote "capital punishment" or "no
capital punishment," that would be a law and the legislature could not delegate
it to the people. Does the law such as the one before us differ from this?
Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. at 508 (Sharswood, J., dissenting).
94. In Holgate Bros. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 A. 672 (1938), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that "where necessary hardship would be incurred" was an inadequate
standard to accompany the legislative delegation to Department of Labor and Industry of the
power to "alter, amend or repeal the basic rules and regulations of the General 44-Hour Week
Law of 1937 (P.L. 2766)."
95. In re Issuance of Restaurant Liquor License to Tate, 196 Pa. Super. 193, 173 A.2d
657 (1961).
96. See Holgate, supra note 94, at 260, 200 A. at 675 (1938).
97. Chartiers Valley Joint School District v. County Bd. of School Directors, 418 Pa.
520, 529, 211 A.2d 487, 493 (1965).
98. But see WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 257 (1985). Judge
Woodside indicates that Holgate represents the high-water mark of the standard requirement
of the non-delegation doctrine. "Although the rules have not changed, the Supreme Court [of
Pennsylvania] is more likely to find adequate standards to guide and restrain agencies in the
statutes today than it did in the days of Holgate."
99. Pennsylvania courts have found these standards to be adequate to accompany the
corresponding delegation of legislative power. See, e.g., Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority,
357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947) (valid to authorize administrators to designate as blighted
areas those "areas which have become blighted because of the unsafe, unsanitary, inadequate
or overcrowded condition of the dwellings therein"); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Water &
Power Resources Bd. v. Green Spring Co., 394 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d 178 (1958) (valid to authorize
the Board to issue permits for construction of dams considering (1) whether the obstruction
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law, but it will look also at the underlying purpose and reasonable
effect of the statute. If the purpose and effect establish a general
standard according to which the power must be exercised, the dele-
gation will not be invalidated.' The standards must, however, be
specific enough to guard against the uncontrolled exercise of discre-
tion by the administrator.' 0 ' The court also will examine the purpose
of the statute to determine the breadth of the administrator's discre-
tion.102 Where the act envinces a clear legislative policy to vest a
commission with broad supervisory powers, the discretionary powers
of the commission also will be broad. 0 3
The existence and adequacy of standards'0 4 accompanying a
legislative delegation is not the only constitutional hurdle a delegat-
ing act must clear. As Locke points out, the act must be complete in
and of itself, needing no further action on the part of the legislature
to make it effective. 0 a It cannot be an invitation to the administrator
to make law,'0 6 but only to apply it. Thus, before the act is "com-
plete," the basic policy choices must have been made by the legisla-
ture.10 7 They alone are vested with this power by the Constitution,108
and they alone are responsible to the electorate. 10 9 In a general sense
would potentially endanger life or property, (2) whether the obstruction would divert the natu-
ral course of the stream or river); Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Meyers, 388 Pa. 444, 130
A.2d 686 (1957) ("adequacy or inadequacy of banking facilities" a reasonable standard); In re
Weaverland Indep. School Dist., 378 Pa. 449, 106 A.2d 812 (1954) (valid to allow the Super-
intendent to approve a petition for the establishment of a new school district if he viewed the
merits of the petition from an "educational standpoint"); In re Fisher, 344 Pa. 96, 23 A.2d
878 (1942) (administrative body given the power to fix "fair" wages, considering such factors
as "the cost of living" and "the reasonable value of services"); Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd.,
322 Pa. 257, 186 A. 336 (1936) (valid to fix milk prices based on the same standards).
100. William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 216, 346
A.2d 269, 293 (1975).
101. Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 160, 351 A.2d 667, 671 (1975). After discussing the
principles of the non-delegation doctrine, the court determined that the power being challenged
did not emanate from the legislature. The State Police Commissioner's power to terminate an
officer for cause had existed at common law. The legislature's codification of this did not make
it legislative power. This obviated the need to inquire whether the legislature had set forth
adequate standards to check the Commissioner's discretion. William Penn Parking, 464 Pa.
168, 456 A.2d 269 (1975).
102. Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 492 Pa. 92, 422 A.2d 487 (1980).
The court noted that the function of the Commission was the regulation of a previously illegal
activity. This being the purpose, the court denied the challenge to the broad powers delegated
to the Commission concerning all aspects of the racing industry. This included the setting of
fee schedules for jockeys.
103. Id. at 96, 422 A.2d at 489.
104. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
105. Locke, 72 Pa. at 496.
106. Id.
107. William Penn Parking, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975).
108. PA. CONST. Art. 11, § 1. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
109. Though the public prosecutor is also responsible to the electorate, he is accountable
only for his enforcement of these basic policy decisions, and not for his setting of policy or law-
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these basic policy decisions, like adequate standards, would serve as
a check on the discretionary powers of an administrator. 110 Any use
of those delegated powers must conform with the stated purpose of
the act, the general factual situations within the contemplation of
the act, and those remedies and sanctions afforded under the statute.
The reasonable effect of any administrative action must comport
with these basic policy decisions of the legislature.
The non-delegation doctrine is alive' in Pennsylvania, though
it may be argued that it is not well." 2 What can be gleaned from
this analysis is that the supreme court will go to virtually any length
to hold a legislative delegation valid.1 13 In summary, the two princi-
pal limitations on the legislature's power to delegate are: the basic
policy choices must be made by the legislature; and the legislation
must provide adequate standards that guide the administrative func-
tion. 14 In determining whether the basic policy choices have been
made, a court will look to the general purpose of the act."' In cer-
tain instances, the court must determine if the legislature has done
whatever possible to delineate the bounds of the power delegated to
an administrative board which, because of its function, necessarily
applies an expertise not typically within the common experience of
making.
110. Gilligan, 492 Pa. at 96, 422 A.2d at 489.
111. Cf. Chambers Development Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, ex rel Allegheny County
Health Dep't, 81 Pa. Commw. 622, 474 A.2d 728 (1984).
112. See supra note 101. See also DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 3:14. In
this section, Professor Davis discussed the typical state opinion regarding the non-delegation
doctrine and the lengths to which a court will go in order to uphold a legislative delegation to
an administrative body. For example, while a state may require "adequate standards" for a
delegation to be valid, it will settle simply for a statement that the administrator must act
reasonably, or in the best interests of the state. Cf. In re Weaverland Indep. School Dist., 378
Pa. 449, 106 A.2d 812 (1954).
113. This, however, does not obviate the need for the non-delegation doctrine. The pur-
poses served by it are laudatory and legally sound. Professor Davis does not dispute this. See
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 315 at 207. It also does not change the law in this Com-
monwealth. Any delegation of legislative power that is challenged will be scrutinized in light of
the principles laid out in this section. See supra notes 83-110. If it is found to be deficient as to
either of the two concerns put forth, it will not pass constitutional muster. Davis takes issue
with this result. A court's inquiry should be directed not at the statute itself, but at the totality
of protections that exist to structure and check the discretionary powers afforded to adminis-
trative agencies. Instead of preventing delegations by the legislature, courts should encourage
delegations provided there exists a check on the unbridled exercise of this power. Some exam-
ples of these safeguards include, internal regulations and standards promulgated by the admin-
istrator, the existence of legislative supervision of his actions, and the possibility of open hear-
ings and judicial review. As to the last, Davis stated: "[Openness is the natural enemy of
arbitrariness and the natural ally in the fight against injustice." DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUS-
TICE at 98 (1969).
114. William Penn Parking, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975).
115. Id.
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the lawmakers. 1 6 In determining the adequacy of the standards, the
court is not limited to the statutory language,' 17 but will look to the
purpose of the legislation and its reasonable effect. In that sense, the
court will fashion standards, if it can, where none are explicitly
stated.
IV. The Scope of the Prosecutor's Discretion'1 8
The United States legal system vests in the prosecutor broad
discretionary powers,119 ranging from the power to decide whom to
charge with which crime, to, in certain cases, deciding the minimum
penalty which a convicted person will receive. 20 The reasons for
vesting such broad powers in the hands of the prosecutor are three-
fold. First, since penal codes tend to be general, the prosecutor must
have discretion to decide whether and to what degree these codes
apply.'12 This promotes the equitable objective of individualized jus-
tice. 2 2 Second, penal codes are examples of "over criminalization,"
in that they define as criminal every act that the public is against,
regardless of enforcement problems or changing societal values . 28
Thus, to permit necessary distinctions to be made requires the vest-
ing of broad discretionary powers. The third and arguably the princi-
pal rationale for prosecutorial discretion stems from the limited re-
sources available for law enforcement.12 4 It would be both physically
and economically impossible for a prosecutor to process every case
that was presented. Therefore, he must be able to use his own discre-
tion in allocating available resources, so as to prosecute criminals
116. Cf. Gilligan, 492 Pa. 92, 422 A.2d 487 (1980); Appeal of Weinstein, 159 Pa.
Super. 437, 441, 48 A.2d I, 3 (1946); Water & Power Resources Bd., 394 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d 178
(1958).
117. William Penn Parking, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975).
118. A complete discussion of the broad discretionary powers possessed by a prosecutor
exceeds the scope of this comment. Therefore, this section discusses generally the powers of the
prosecutor pursuant to the charging function in order to draw the distinction between these
powers and those exercised in the post-trial setting.
119. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV 1521
(1981).
120. As is evidenced by the Act, an interesting trend has emerged. As legislatures have
taken discretion away from sentencing courts the level of prosecutorial discretion has increased
proportionally. This can be either given explicitly, as in the case of § 9712 and certain recidi-
vist statutory schemes, see, e.g, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9713 (1982), or it may be exercised
more discretely, as in the prosecutor's decision to charge a defendant with an offense that will
trigger these acts. For a discussion of recidivist statutes and the constitutional problem posed
by them, see Note, Constitutional Infirmities of Indiana's Habitual Offender Statute, 13 IND.
L. REV. 606 (1980).
121. See Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion an Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 383 (1976).
122. See Gershan, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, § 4.2 (1982).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., H. ZEISEL. THE LIMITS OF LAw ENFORCEMENT (1982).
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most effectively.
The apex of the prosecutor's power lies in the charging func-
tions. 125 It is well established that the Constitution permits the pros-
ecutor, an actor in the executive branch, to make the decision
whether or not to bring criminal charges 2 6 against an individual,
and what charges to file among several possibly applicable stat-
utes.127 There are both constitutional 128 and ethical 12 9 restrictions on
this power. A prosecutor may not be discriminatory in enforcing'30 a
law if that discrimination is based on some arbitrary or invidious
classification.'I" In addition, he may not bring a prosecution against
a given defendant based on personal or political motivations.3 2 In
attempting to prove an improperly motivated prosecution, however,
the challenging defendant has a difficult burden to overcome. Courts
create a rebuttable presumption that the prosecutor has acted in
good faith.388
Another aspect of the charging function is selecting which
charges are to be brought from various provisions which proscribe
the same criminal act. In United States v. Batchelder,13 4 the United
States Supreme Court ruled that, absent a finding that a prosecutor
lacked probable cause, the decision as to what charge to file rested in
the prosecutor's discretion. 35 This power may have a profound im-
pact on a defendant. In Batchelder, the United States Attorney had
a choice of proceeding under one of two overlapping provisions of the
125. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-
TION (approved draft 1971) § 3.4. See also Vorenberg, supra note 119, at 1524.
126. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 304
Pa. Super. 297, 450 A.2d 689 (1982); Petition of Piscanio, 235 Pa. Super. 490, 344 A.2d 658
(1975).
127. U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979).
128. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), the Court held that selective enforcement
in and of itself was not unconstitutional. However, if it is established that the stated selection
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification, a constitutional defense may arise. Id. at 456.
129. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at § 3.9(c).
130. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that such enforcement is a
violation of equal protection).
131. In order to make out a constitutional defense, the following elements must be
proven: (1) that others similarly situated to the defendant were not prosecuted; (2) that the
defendant was singled out as a result of some conscious, deliberate, and purposeful decision;
(3) that the discriminatory selection was based upon an arbitrary, invidious or impermissible
consideration. United States v. Verrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974). But see People v. Till-
man, 4 IIl. App.3d 910, 282 N.E.2d 231 (1972) (refusing to recognize this defense on the
ground that there is no deprivation of a right since there is no right to commit a crime).
132. See supra note 131.
133. Oyler v. Boles, 308 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126 (1st
Cir. 1981).
134. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
135. Id. at 123-24.
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Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.186 Although
the two provisions made identical conduct illegal, one provision car-
ried a maximum of five years, 1 7 the other a maximum of two
years. 88 The Court upheld the prosecutor's choice to proceed under
the harsher statute." 9
The court of appeals in Batchelder expressed doubt about the
constitutionality of this legislative redundancy.140 In its view, be-
cause the two provisions prohibited identical conduct, the prosecu-
tor's discretion as to which of the two penalties would apply would
be unfettered,14 1 leading to unequal justice. The United States Su-
preme Court summarily rejected this argument. 42 The prosecutor's
discretion to choose between the two provisions was not unfettered'
43
because it was subject to the constitutional restraints outlined in
Oyler v. Boles"4 and Yick Wo v. Hopkins.' 45 This decision, like any
other within the prosecutor's charging function, was given a pre-
sumption of good faith. The Court also rejected the argument that
136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 1202 (1968).
137. In pertinent part,
18 U.S.C. § 922(h) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person -
(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana or any depressant or
stimulant drug . . . or narcotic drug...; or
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to
any mental institution;
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 924(a) provides in relevant part: "Whoever violates any provision of
this chapter . . . shall be fined $5,000, or imprisoned five years, or both ....
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) provides:
Any person who -
(I) has been convicted in a court of the United States or of a state or any politi-
cal subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions,
or
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a state or any
political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or
(5) being an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, and who
receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the
date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned for more than two years, or both.
139. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124.
140. 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1978).
141. Id. at 633 n.ll.
142. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 124-25.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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the prosecutor was empowered to determine the ultimate criminal
sanction. This was still the province of the court. Prosecutorial dis-
cretion merely enabled the sentencing judge to impose a greater sen-
tence and fine under one provision rather than under the other. " 6
It is important to note that the Court examined the issue of
prosecutorial discretion in the context of the charging function. The
Court has not, as of yet, examined the question of whether it is
within the prosecutor's discretion to decide which sentencing scheme
will apply if that decision is not made in the context of the charging
function, but instead is made in the post-conviction phase of the
prosecution. 147
V. The Act is Unconstitutional Because it Gives the Prosecutor
Standardless Discretion in Deciding Whether to Pursue the
Mandatory Minimum Sentence.
Any analysis of the Act under the non-delegation doctrine must
begin with the standards set forth in Locke's Appeal." 8 The Act
must be complete. It cannot be an invitation to the administrator to
make law. The administrator, however, may determine matters of
fact. The Act in question does not become operable unless two condi-
tions are met. 19 The prosecutor must give timely notice of his inten-
tion to proceed under the Act, and the sentencing court must deter-
mine by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused visibly
possessed a firearm.150 Because the second condition involves a
purely factual determination, it comports with Locke. Arguably, the
first condition does not.
The notice provision involves a purely subjective determination
by the prosecutor that the Act should apply. It is not self-executing,
but instead turns upon a discretionary decision by the District Attor-
ney. The Act's application is wholly dependent upon his decision to
proceed under the sentencing scheme. The importance of this deci-
sion for a given defendant cannot be underestimated.
146. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125.
147. As has been noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to see this distinction
(see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text). The United States Supreme Court apparently
will address this issue in the McMillan case.
148. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
150. "Visibly possessed" has been defined for purposes of the Act as: "[plossession that
manifests itself in the process of the crime. Thus where the victim never saw the gun, but
heard the shot, saw smoke and sustained a gun shot wound, that evidence was sufficient to
prove that [the defendant] visibly possessed a firearm." Commonwealth v. Woodlyn, 345 Pa.
Super. 200, 497 A.2d 1374 (1985).
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Thus, Dennison, at age 73, is faced with the prospect of spend-
ing the rest of his natural life incarcerated not because the
Mandatory Sentencing Act rests quietly upon the pages of a
book of statutes, but rather because the District Attorney has
chosen to lift that book and throw it not too gently in Dennison's
direction. 51
Prosecutors must make subjective determinations as to the ap-
plicability of criminal statutes daily.1 52 These decisions are not only
made but are encouraged. The decision not to charge a given individ-
ual is not open to judicial review. The decision to charge rests within
the sound discretion of the prosecutor,153 and it will not be disturbed
absent a showing of selective or discriminatory enforcement. Al-
though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court saw no difference 5" be-
tween the post-trial decision afforded the prosecutor under the Act
and the daily pre-trial decisions he must make pursuant to his charg-
ing function, it is arguable that a qualitative difference does exist.
The pre-trial, post-trial distinction is not merely one of timing
or semantics. First, the reasons underlying the great latitude af-
forded under the charging power do not exist in the post-trial setting.
There are no limited resources to be saved by not filing under the
Act. Second, while the decision to charge is given a presumption of
validity, it is either proven or disproven in the openness of the court-
room. The decision to provide the requisite notice is made in the
confines of the District Attorney's office, and there is no degree of
certainty as to what, if any, criteria are applied to formulate this
decision.1 5 5 Furthermore, the District Attorney need not justify this
decision at the sentencing hearing. The judicial inquiry is statutorily
limited to whether the defendant visibly possessed a firearm.'"
The third qualitative distinction involves the differing degrees
by which the two decisions will ultimately affect the sentence re-
ceived by the defendant. The charging power allows the prosecutor,
as a practical matter, to affect the sentence. The Batchelder'5" and
Lutz'" decisions have recognized this. The effect, however, is indi-
151. Dennison, 10 Phila. at 538.
152. See supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. See also Commonwealth v. Lutz,
508 Pa. 297, 306, 495 A.2d 928, 932 (1985).
154. Wright at 40 n.4, 494 A.2d at 363 n.4. (See supra note 80 for full text of n.4.)
155. Dennison, 10 Phila. 540-41.
156. See supra note 22 subsection (c).
157. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
158. Lutz at 306, 495 A.2d at 932-33. In Lutz, the defendant raised the issue whether
the district attorney's discretion was limited by the Mandatory Sentencing provisions of the
motor vehicle code. See supra note 5. The court said it was not, stressing that "Accelerated
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rect at best. It is tempered by the sentencing court's consideration of
all other factors 59 attendant in a given case. Also, while the prosecu-
tor, pursuant to the charging power, may decide between one sen-
tencing scheme or another, the ultimate sentence is still up to the
sound discretion of the trial judge and may fall anywhere within the
statutory limits. The discretion given the prosecutor under the Act
allows him, in the post-trial setting, to preclude one of the sentencing
schemes. In Batchelder,1 0 the prosecutor was merely providing for
the possibility of a greater sentence, while under the Act, the prose-
cutor is mandating that a minimum sentence of five years be
imposed.
These three differences show that the two decisions do not de-
rive from the same prosecutorial power. If, as the Wright opinion
indicates, these two decisions derive from the same power, there
arises no need to discuss the delegation question. The prosecutor is
acting qua prosecutor, and this power does not derive from any legis-
lative pronouncement. If the decision to proceed under the Act is
qualitatively different than those normally possessed by the prosecu-
tor, then the power to make this decision must come from the
legislature.
Because the Act is not self-executing, the legislature has chosen
to delegate the power to determine whether the Act should be ap-
plied in a given case. It may confer discretion, however, it must pro-
vide adequate standards to guide the prosecutor and check his dis-
cretion. The legislature must also make the basic policy decisions
concerning the Act and its applicability. Simply because the legisla-
ture has chosen to delegate this power will not necessarily invalidate
the legislation. As to the subject delegation, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has deemed it a proper exercise of legislative judg-
ment.16 The legislature's power to make this judgment is not in
question here. What is in question is the way in which the legislature
has exercised this power.
A stated purpose of the non-delegation doctrine is to insure that
the basic policy decisions are made by the politically responsible par-
ties. One basic choice has been made. Crimes committed with fire-
arms should be punished more severely than those committed with-
Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD") is a pretrial disposition. His failure to submit the case for
ARD did not in itself set the sentence. If the defendant is acquitted, no sentence will issue. If
he is not, the legislation provides the sentence, not the prosecutor." (emphasis added)
159. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
160. See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125.
161. Wright at 40 n.4, 494 A.2d at 363 n.4.
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out firearms. A question left unanswered, however, is in which
instances this Act should not apply? The legislature, by providing
the notice requirement, has decided implicitly it should not apply in
all instances. When should it be inapplicable? What if the defendant
was initially a victim, who used legally unjustifiable force 62 in repel-
ling his attacker? Will the Act apply? These are basic policy choices
to which the Act does not speak. Instead, the legislature has abdi-
cated its duty, inviting the prosecutor to make these choices for it.
If, however, the basic policy decision was to allow the prosecu-
tor to decide, a second infirmity becomes evident. By what standards
is this decision to be made? Again, the statute is silent. There is
neither explicit language to guide the prosecutor nor parameters to
check his discretion. Moreover, no standards are evident from an ex-
amination of the basic purpose of the Act. If the General Assembly
truly intended to impose mandatory sentences, then any manner and
degree of prosecutorial discretion exercised in this post-trial setting
would be inconsistent with the Act's stated purpose.
It has been suggested that the prosecutor is not in a position to
exercise unfettered discretion. 162 He is still bound by constitutional
constraints. Such constraints are conditioned on judicial review of his
action. Under the Act, however, the sentencing hearing is limited to
a factual determination and constitutes a mere ratification of his de-
cision. The constraints are also inadequate because in the post-trial
setting the prosecutor has a greater effect on the sentence. He is
improperly placed in a position where inappropriate motivations,
such as vindictiveness or political advantage, can lead him to advo-
cate a sentence of at least five years imprisonment. These ramifica-
tions are serious, and warrant additional protection in the nature of
adequate standards promulgated by the legislature to check this dis-
cretion. The legislature must provide such standards to cure the con-
stitutional infirmity of the Act.
VI. Epilogue
In the year since this comment was written, defendants have
continued to challenge the constitutional validity of the Act, basing
their challenges on the notice requirement and its concomitant
prosecutorial discretion. Two significant superior court opinions have
since been handed down which have attempted to deal with the issue
presented by this comment.
162. Dennison, 10 Phila. at 540.
163. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1986
In Commonwealth v. Anderson,'6' the issue presented to the
court was whether the vesting of unbridled discretion in the prosecu-
tor to determine whether the mandatory sentence of five years would
be applied, violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court
held that it did not. It began by noting that this argument "misap-
prehended" 65 the nature of the Act. It was true, the court noted,
that the "language at first blush would seem to empower the prose-
cutor to decide when and to whom the [A]ct should apply."1 66 How-
ever, it reasoned that "the obligatory language of § 9712 . . . makes
clear that the mandatory minimum shall be imposed in all cases
where the sentencing court has determined that the conditions are
met., 67
This interpretation would seem to beg the question. If the notice
provision is not met, the Act is not applicable. If the prosecutor does
not file notice to proceed under this section, there is no inquiry made
by the sentencing court as to its applicability. Instead the sentencing
hearing will focus on factors relevant under the indeterminant sen-
tencing scheme. 6 8 Without the required notice the sentencing
court's "inquiry" becomes a mere ratification of the District Attor-
ney's decision that the five year mandatory sentence should not
apply.
In Commonwealth v. Cofoni,'69 Judge Cercone delivered the
opinion for the court which may have the effect of rendering this
comment moot. Judge Cercone held that the notice provision pro-
vided "no discretion to the prosecutor in the proper case.' 70 "[T]hus
as we read the statute . . . where some quantum of evidence exists
that an enumerated crime was committed by a defendant who visibly
possessed a firearm, the district attorney must invoke section 9712
.... "171 This interpretation is clearly at odds with the Wright 7
opinion, which referred to the prosecutor's "measure of discretion' ' 7 3
under the Act. Perhaps anticipating this, Judge Cercone noted that
this comment in the Wright decision was merely dicta and not a
holding in fact case.' 74
164. 345 Pa. Spuer. 407, 498 A.2d 857 (1985).
165. Id. at 412, 498 A.2d at 889.
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. See supra note 2 for an explanation of this scheme.
169. 349 Pa. Super. 407, 503 A.2d 430 (1986).
170. Id. at 413, 503 A.2d at 434.
171. Cofoni, at 413-14, 503 A.2d at 434.
172. Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985).
173. Id. at 40, n.4, 494 A.2d at 361 n.4 (see supra note 80 for full text of the footnote).
174. Cofoni, at 414 n.2, 503 A.2d at 434 n.2.
MANDATORY SENTENCING
The interpretation given the Act in Cofoni is certainly an im-
provement over the "measure of discretion" language used in
Wright. It removes many of the inherent dangers that stem from
unbridled prosecutorial discretion. However, a question remains.
What quantum of evidence must exist before the mandatory provi-
sions of the Act must apply? What facts are necessary to warrant its
application? This author wonders whether the prosecutor's inquiry
into the existence of "some quantum" of evidence of the use of a
firearm, will differ as a practical matter from the determination
made prior to Cofoni.
Mark B. Sheppard

